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ABSTRACT 
We estimate the effect of lifting the fruit and vegetable cropping restriction on cropping 
preference in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, using a stochastic simulation model and Stochastic 
Efficiency analysis.  Results suggest that, based on risk-adjusted net returns, lifting the cropping 
restriction may likely have the most profound effect on watermelon and cabbage acreage. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2002 Farm Bill authorized the Direct Payment and Counter-cyclical Payment 
Programs (DP & CCP) for U.S. agricultural producers of specific crops
1.  Both DP and CCP 
programs provide direct payments to eligible producers.  Since both DP and CCP payments are 
“decoupled” from current production decisions, it has been claimed by U.S. policymakers that 
the programs do not distort current production decisions (Farm Service Agency (FSA)). 
There is still considerable debate over how this system of government payments might 
actually affect production.  Some contend that decoupled payments significantly affect 
agricultural production and trade (Key, Lubowski, and Roberts).  Five arguments typically 
underpin the assertion that these programs have distorting effects.  First, the payments influence 
production, because restrictions in the policy preclude the planting of fruits and vegetables 
                                                 
1 Base acres and payment yields are established for the following commodities:  Barley, corn, grain sorghum 
(including dual purpose varieties that can be harvested as grain), oats, canola, crambe, flax, mustard, rapeseed, 
safflower, sesame, sunflower (including oil and non-oil varieties), peanuts, rice (excluding wild rice), soybeans, 
upland cotton, and wheat. 
  2(FAVs) or the conversion of land to nonagricultural uses.  Second, the perfect market 
assumptions that underpin the theory that these payments do not affect production are not 
maintained in practice (Key, Lubowski, and Roberts).  Third, payments help producers overcome 
credit constraints by serving as capital directly or by increasing financing options through 
increased wealth and increased land values.  Fourth, payments change the producers’ level of 
risk-averseness through increasing wealth.  Lastly, the potential to update base acres/yields in the 
future offers incentive to continue to increase production of specific crops (Goodwin and 
Mishra). 
The first argument given above, the restriction on the planting of FAVs, is the focus of 
this paper, since many policy observers expect the restriction to be dropped in future legislation.  
Producers who participate in DP and CCP programs are subject to certain restrictions on the 
planting of wild rice, fruits, and vegetables (WR/FAV).  In general, if WR/FAVs are planted on 
DP/CCP base acres and certain exceptions do not apply, the DP/CCP contract has been violated 
and may be terminated.  If FSA determines the violation does not warrant contract termination, 
the farm’s payment acres will be reduced by an acre for each acre of WR/FAV planted on base 
acres.  FSA will also assess an additional payment reduction based on the market value of the 
WR/FAV (FSA). 
Since 1996, there has been ongoing research done on the impacts that these “decoupled” 
payments may have on production decisions.  Examples include work done by Key, Lubowski, 
and Roberts; Goodwin and Mishra; Chau and deGorter; Ahearn, Yee, and Korb; and McDonald 
and Sumner.  However, there has been little work done to isolate the effects of the WR/FAV 
planting restriction on production decisions.  However, the seemingly minor restriction has now 
become a focus of ongoing policy debates (Hudson et al). 
  3As part of the recent U.S./Brazil cotton dispute, the WTO ruled that due to cropping 
restrictions, the U.S. DP and CCP do not qualify for WTO exemptions from reduction 
commitments as fully decoupled income support.  This finding, along with several others, meant 
that the U.S. had exceeded agreed-upon 1992 subsidy limits, which opened the door for Brazil to 
argue its complaints against U.S. cotton policies (Hudson et al).  Hence, as long as the WR/FAV 
planting restrictions remain in place, the DP and CCP programs are not considered “green box” 
and are subject to ongoing subsidy reduction commitments. 
As early as May 2005, legislation was introduced that would lift the planting restriction 
on fruits and vegetables used for processing.  Under this legislation, U.S. commodity program 
participants may produce FAVs for processing use on acreage enrolled in the DP and CCP 
programs.  This acreage would be subtracted from the acreage producers use as a basis for 
calculating government payments in the year the FAVs are planted, but the acreage could be re-
enrolled in subsequent years in which FAVs are not grown (Patterson).  However, it is doubtful 
that legislation crafted in such a way that it continues to tie DP and CCP to specific crops will 
fulfill WTO expectations.  Hence, it may be more likely that future legislation will allow 
producers to continue receiving DP and CCP payments for base acres while concurrently 
growing FAVs on those same base acres.  The fruit and vegetable industry is concerned that the 
lifting of the FAV restriction, to comply with the WTO ruling, will cause declining output prices 
due to increased production (Morris). 
ECONOMIC PROBLEM 
How might a change in the current cropping restriction contained in the DP and CCP 
provisions of the U.S. Farm Bill affect harvested acreage of U.S. fruits and vegetables?  The 
analysis presented here does not comprehensively answer that question, but begins the 
  4investigation by addressing a more specific question:  How does the lifting of the FAV planting 
restriction change the ranking (based on expected risk-adjusted net returns) of the primary crops 
grown in the Lower Rio Grande Valley (LRGV) of Texas? 
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this study was to estimate the change in stochastic ranking (based on net 
income) of the primary crops grown in the LRGV due to a lifting of the FAV planting restriction.  
Primary crops chosen excluded permanent crops such as citrus, since we were interested in 
analyzing crops that could be rotated more easily on a year to year basis.  Crops included in the 
analysis are: green cabbage (CB), cantaloupe (CP), corn for grain (CN), upland cotton (CT), 
honeydew (HD), spring onions (ON), sorghum for grain (GS), and watermelon (WM). 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A stochastic simulation model was used to empirically estimate the per acre net income 
(NI) distributions for alternative crops in 2006, under two scenarios.  The first scenario assumes 
that the current FAV planting restriction remains in place.  The second scenario assumes that the 
FAV planting restriction is lifted, and producers continue to receive DP and CCP payments 




















 is the stochastic annual net income per acre for scenario i crop j 
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 is the stochastic annual yield per acre for scenario i crop j 
 
Annual prices and yields are the basic stochastic variables in the model.  These variables 
make intra-annual prices, intra-annual yields, loan deficiency payments, and counter cyclical 
payments stochastic.  Since stochastic prices also affect the decision to harvest (particularly for 
FAVs), harvest costs are also stochastic, which makes total variable costs stochastic.  A 
multivariate empirical (MVE) distribution of annual prices and yields for the LRGV was 
estimated and used to simulate these variables.  A MVE distribution of annual U.S. prices for 
  6corn, cotton, and sorghum was also estimated and used to simulate these variables for use in 
estimating government payments.  A MVE distribution has been shown to appropriately 
correlate random variables based on their historical correlation (Richardson et al).  Parameters 
for the MVE distribution were estimated using historical yields and prices. 
DATA 
Revenue Side 
Annual harvested acreage, average yield per acre, and average price received per unit for 
each crop was collected for each of the four counties in the LRGV for years 1992-2004.  The 
data was extracted from the Annual Crop Increment Reports from Texas Cooperative Extension.  
The data was then used to calculate annual prices and yields for the LRGV for years 1992-2004.  
Cottonseed price and yield data was also used to contribute to cotton revenue. 
Weekly (during season) price data for LRGV FAV crops, years 1998-2004, was collected 
from the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS).  Monthly price data for Texas program crops, 
years 1988-2004, was collected from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).  The 
intra-annual prices were used to create the intra-annual price indices, in order to account for 
intra-annual variation in price. 
Annual U.S. program crop data was collected from NASS, and included prices for years 
1970-2004, loan rates, target prices, and direct payment rates.  The 2003 data for cotton, corn, 
and sorghum in the LRGV counties was collected from the FSA, and included DP yields, DP 
quantities, DP acres, CCP payment yields, CCP payment quantities, and CCP acres.  This data 
was used to estimate government payments per acre in the LRGV for 2006. 
 
 
  7Cost Side 
The 2004 Itemized Crop Budgets for the LRGV were collected from Texas Cooperative 
Extension.  The budgets were adjusted to estimate costs in 2006, using Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) production cost indices (% change). 
NET INCOME AND RISK ANALYSIS 
Simulated probability distributions of net income for each crop under each of the policy 
scenarios in 2006 were used as an indicator of their risk and profitability.  While only two 
general scenarios exist, planting restriction versus no planting restriction, the empirical model 
had to account for sub-scenarios under the no planting restriction regime.  The amount of DP and 
CCP payments received per acre while planting FAVs depended on the crop base used.  For the 
planting of program crops the base used was assumed to be for that particular crop.  Ranking 
risky alternatives such as different cropping regimes is more difficult than simply comparing the 
average net income.  In the literature, risky alternatives have been ranked using mean variance 
analysis and stochastic dominance (Richardson).  These procedures often result in inconclusive 
rankings for some types of decision makers (McCarl). 
A procedure proposed by Hardaker, Richardson, Lien, and Schumann, using certainty 
equivalents (CE)
2, ranks risky decisions for different types of decision makers based on a range 
of risk aversion levels.  Their procedure, Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function 
(SERF), calls for calculating the CE that a decision maker would place on a risky alternative 
relative to a no risk investment at different absolute risk aversion coefficients (ARACs)
3.  An 
                                                 
2 The CE is the amount of money a decision maker would be willing to pay to gain a fair bet (risky alternative or 
investment) vs. a risk-free alternative with the same average return.  The investment with the greater CE is the 
preferred strategy. 
3 Pratt and Arrow defined RAC or r(x) as a function of wealth (x) as the negative ratio of the second and first 
derivatives of a utility function u(x), or r(x) =-u’’(x)/u’(x).  Therefore, this coefficient is positive for risk aversion 
and diminishes for increasing x if there is diminishing risk aversion (Hardaker et al).  The RACs represent the 
decision maker’s degree of risk aversion (RAC>0), neutrality (RAC=0), or risk preference (RAC<0), and are used to 
  8advantage of using CE over other methods is that a risk ranking can be done without calculating 
individual ARACs, since a range of ARACs is used to represent a wide range of risk 
preference/aversion levels.  Hence, preferences can be estimated for different classes of decision 
makers based on their risk preference (ARAC).  Additionally, the absolute differences in the CE 
values between risky alternatives represent the risk premium that decision makers place on the 
preferred alternative over another alternative (Ribera, Hons, and Richardson).  In this case, the 
risk premium represents the amount of money that a decision maker would have to be paid to be 
indifferent between growing one crop versus another.  In this study, the CE ranking procedure 
was applied to ARAC levels ranging from -.04 (risk-preferring) to .04 (risk-averse). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  Recall that each scenario represents the following: 
  Scenario 1:  Continued planting restriction on FAVs 
Scenario 2a:  Planting FAVs on corn base acreage while receiving DP and CCP 
payments for that acreage 
Scenario 2b:  Planting FAVs on cotton base acreage while receiving DP and CCP 
payments for that acreage 
Scenario 2c:  Planting FAVs on sorghum base acreage while receiving DP and 
CCP payments for that acreage 
Non-stochastic Results 
Scenario 1 (Continued planting restriction on FAVs) 
                                                                                                                                                             
classify decision makers.  Risk-averse decision makers are willing to take a fair bet if the increased risk has an 
increased payoff, risk-neutral agents prefer strategies with the highest mean payoff without regard to risk (variance 
of the payoff), and risk-preferring agents prefer strategies with greater downside risk if the potential exists for a 
large payoff.  The CE procedure ranks risky strategies over a feasible range of RACs and thus avoids having to 
estimate RACs for individual decision makers (Hardaker et al and Ribera et al). 
  9Based on mean (risk free) net income ranking of the alternative crops, the crop with the 
highest expected net income per acre is preferred.  The 2006 ranking is as follows:  ON 
($284.83), CT ($193.73), WM ($140.04), CP ($56.37), CN ($28.99), GS (-$43.80), CB (-
$65.14), and HD (-$396.47) (Table 1). 
Scenario 2a (No FAV planting restriction and corn base) 
Based on mean (risk free) net income ranking of the alternative crops, the crop with the 
highest expected net income per acre is preferred.  The 2006 ranking is as follows:  ON 
($318.67), CT ($193.73), WM ($173.89), CP ($90.21), CN ($28.99), CB (-$31.29), GS (-
$43.80), and HD (-$362.63) (Table 1). 
The only change in ranking under this scenario is that cabbage would now be preferred over 
grain sorghum. 
Scenario 2b (No FAV planting restriction and cotton base) 
Based on mean (risk free) net income ranking of the alternative crops, the crop with the 
highest expected net income per acre is preferred.  The 2006 ranking is as follows:  ON 
($405.92), WM ($261.13), CT ($193.73), CP ($177.45), CB ($55.96), CN (28.99), GS (-$43.80), 
and HD (-$275.38) (Table 1). 
Using cotton base, watermelon is now ranked over cotton, and cabbage returns turn 
positive, and cabbage is now ranked over corn. 
Scenario 2c (No FAV planting restriction and grain sorghum base) 
Based on mean (risk free) net income ranking of the alternative crops, the crop with the 
highest expected net income per acre is preferred.  The 2006 ranking is as follows:  ON 
($314.78), CT ($193.73), WM ($170.00), CP ($86.32), CN (28.99), CB (-$35.18), GS (-$43.80), 
and HD (-$366.52) (Table 1). 
  10Like the corn base scenario, the only change in ranking over scenario 1 is that cabbage is 
now more profitable than grain sorghum. 
Using the non-stochastic results, the most significant change in crop preference occurs 
using the cotton base.  This result is to be expected, as per acre government payments to cotton 
base tend to be four times higher than either corn or sorghum payments in the LRGV.  Hence, 
DP and CCP payments to cotton base tend to more greatly affect expected NI. 
At this point it should be noted that the proposed model does not account directly for 
changes in expected prices due to shifts in supply, which can occur as producers change their 
cropping preferences.  We recognize that this research should be expanded in the future to 
estimate new equilibrium prices.  The work done by McDonald and Sumner offers a useable 
framework.  The model does account for correlation between prices, since a MVE distribution 
was used in simulation. 
Stochastic Results 
A series of cumulative distribution function (CDF) graphs were generated from the 
simulated NI results for each scenario.  Visual appraisal of the CDFs indicated only minor 
changes in the CDFs from one scenario to another.  However, these minor changes can have a 
significant impact on the preference ranking of the crops, particularly for certain classes of 
producers.  In addition, the CDFs did cross one another and therefore the more rigorous SERF 
method was used to determine the ranking of crops under the assumption of risk.  The CEs were 
evaluated to rank cropping preferences at different levels of risk preference/aversion.  Tables 2 
through 5 summarize the SERF analysis by presenting the CEs for each of the scenarios.  Recall 
that a higher (less negative) CE represents a more preferred crop at each level of ARAC, and the 
  11higher (less negative) the ARAC the more risk-averse the producer.  The preferred crop at each 
ARAC is denoted in green, and the least preferred is denoted in red. 
Table 2 indicates that under current policy conditions onion production should be 
strongly preferred by more risk-preferring producers (negative ARACs), as well as preferred by 
risk-neutral producers (ARAC = 0).  Cotton production ranks first for risk-averse producers 
(positive ARACs).  Grain sorghum production should be the least preferred option for risk-
preferring producers, while honeydew production ranks last for risk-neutral and risk-averse 
producers.  Table 3 indicates that cabbage outranks corn when we move from scenario 1 (current 
policy) to scenario 2a (corn base). 
Table 4 summarizes CEs using cotton base under the regime of no FAV planting 
restriction.    Risk-preferring producers should still favor planting onions over other crops, 
however watermelon now ranks higher than cotton, and cabbage ranks higher than corn for the 
risk-preferring producers.  For risk-neutral producers, onion production remains ranked first, but 
watermelon now outranks cotton, and cabbage outranks grain sorghum.  For risk-averse 
producers under the cotton base scenario, watermelon production is now ranked first, versus 
being ranked third under current policy conditions.  Table 5 indicates that there is no change in 
preference ranking when moving from current policy to the grain sorghum base scenario. 
Table 6 summarizes the ranking of crop preference under each scenario, based on CE.  
The table shows only the ranking for the most risk-preferring producers (ARAC = -.04), risk-
neutral producers (ARAC = 0), and the most risk-averse producers (ARAC = .04).    
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Due to the recent WTO cotton ruling in the U.S./Brazil case, the FAV planting restriction 
is likely to be lifted in future U.S. farm policy.  The FAV industry fears that the lifting of this 
  12restriction will cause declining FAV prices due to increased FAV plantings by DP and CCP 
program participants.  The objective of this study was to estimate potential changes in crop 
planting preference in the LRGV due to a lifting of the FAV planting restriction. 
Based on a mean NI ranking, cabbage becomes preferred over grain sorghum when the 
planting restriction is lifted and corn base or grain sorghum base acreage is used.  Using cotton 
base acreage, watermelon becomes preferred over cotton, and cabbage becomes preferred over 
corn. 
When risk (variability) is accounted for, the following changes occur in ranking for risk-
preferring producers; watermelon becomes preferred over cotton when moving to scenario 2b 
(cotton base), and cabbage becomes preferred over corn when moving to either scenario 2a (corn 
base) or scenario 2b (cotton base).  Watermelon becomes preferred over cotton, and cabbage 
becomes preferred over grain sorghum for risk-neutral producers when cotton base is used.  
Watermelon becomes preferred over all crops when cotton base is used for risk-averse producers. 
The results suggest that the most profound change in cropping preference in the LRGV 
from lifting the FAV planting restriction might occur for crops planted on cotton base acreage.  
Since government payments to cotton base tend to be considerably higher than corn or grain 
sorghum, using cotton base has a larger impact on the relative risk of planting FAVs.  If there is 
an increase in FAV planting due to a lifting of the planting restriction, the most likely increases 
could be for watermelon and cabbage in the LRGV.  The risk in planting onions, cantaloupe, or 
honeydew does not appear to be overcome by DP and CCP payments, relative to other crop 
choices available.  Any change in cropping practices based on risk-adjusted NI alone, assumes 
that no other constraints exist that keep producers from growing a particular crop.  The authors 
are not claiming that other constraints do not exist. 
  13Table 1 
Summary of 2006 Simulated Net Income Results ($/Acre) 
                          
   Minimum  Mean  Maximum        Minimum  Mean  Maximum 
Scenario 1              Scenario 2a         
CB -290.44  -65.14  164.52      CB  -269.28  -31.29  215.94 
CP -1213.53  56.37  1669.32      CP  -1167.67  90.21  1701.01 
CN -50.18  28.99  220.03      CN  -50.18  28.99  220.03 
CT -47.48  193.73  611.16      CT  -47.48  193.73  611.16 
HD -1339.60  -396.47  671.86      HD  -1318.44  -362.63  693.02 
ON -788.92  284.83  4923.07      ON  -748.41  318.67  4944.23 
GS  -98.62 -43.80  108.91      GS  -98.62  -43.80 108.91 
WM -123.55  140.04  556.16      WM  -96.98 173.89  586.12 
                         
   Minimum  Mean  Maximum        Minimum  Mean  Maximum 
Scenario 2b              Scenario 2c         
CB -167.06  55.96  287.90      CB  -267.25  -35.18  200.99 
CP -1090.15  177.46  1792.69      CP  -1177.06  86.32  1705.79 
CN -50.18  28.99  220.03      CN  -50.18  28.99  220.03 
CT -47.48  193.73  611.16      CT  -47.48  193.73  611.16 
HD -1216.22  -275.38  789.15      HD  -1319.03  -366.52  692.44 
ON -665.54  405.92  5033.29      ON  -752.44  314.78  4943.64 
GS  -98.62 -43.80  108.91      GS  -98.62  -43.80 108.91 
WM -17.96  261.13  679.54      WM  -89.90 170.00  589.53 
                         
Scenario 1 (Continued planting restriction on FAVs)                    
Scenario 2a (No FAV planting restriction and corn base)                    
Scenario 2b (No FAV planting restriction and cotton base)                  
Scenario 2c (No FAV planting restriction and grain sorghum base)                 




Certainty Equivalents at Various ARAC Levels (Scenario 1 – Current Policy) 
ARAC Onion  Cabbage  Cantaloupe  Watermelon Honeydew Cotton  Corn  G.  Sorghum 
-0.0400  4807.97 86.70  1556.12  452.82  556.73  496.27 121.75 8.67 
-0.0367  4797.53 81.83  1546.31  445.15  546.27  485.99 114.61 3.41 
-0.0333  4785.03 76.31  1534.67  436.43  533.71  473.80 106.68 -1.96 
-0.0300  4769.80 69.99  1520.61  426.46  518.36  459.16 97.96  -7.35 
-0.0267  4750.88 62.69  1503.29  414.99  499.20  441.40 88.62  -12.64 
-0.0233  4726.79 54.16  1481.44  401.63  474.59  419.71 78.93  -17.73 
-0.0200  4695.24 44.08  1453.01  385.79  441.88  393.28 69.29  -22.53 
-0.0167  4652.35 32.04  1414.47  366.39  396.50  361.72 60.18  -26.99 
-0.0133  4591.02 17.60  1359.21  341.56  330.06  325.91 51.94  -31.07 
-0.0100  4495.92 0.37  1272.81  308.11  227.10  288.53 44.76  -34.77 
-0.0067  4322.92 -19.71  1116.36  261.83  65.56  253.02 38.64  -38.10 
-0.0033  3856.35 -42.02  757.07  202.02  -151.43 221.36  33.44  -41.10 
0.0000  402.29 -36.57  91.43  73.14  -292.57 73.14  18.29  -36.57 
0.0033 -444.85 -87.33  -381.50  91.58  -693.79  169.60 25.12  -46.24 
0.0067 -537.03 -107.31  -638.66  59.26  -902.12  148.50 21.70  -48.44 
0.0100 -579.57 -124.60  -794.02  37.81  -1007.69  130.11 18.63  -50.44 
0.0133 -606.40 -139.30  -887.29  22.61  -1068.34  114.14 15.83  -52.26 
0.0167 -626.01 -151.79  -947.49  11.01  -1108.64  100.34 13.25  -53.93 
0.0200 -641.49 -162.44  -989.20  1.63  -1138.10  88.40 10.85 -55.47 
0.0233 -654.24 -171.61  -1019.73  -6.31  -1160.93  78.05 8.60  -56.88 
0.0267 -665.01 -179.58  -1043.04  -13.23  -1179.29  69.04 6.50  -58.19 
0.0300 -674.25 -186.56  -1061.40  -19.41  -1194.43  61.13 4.52  -59.41 
0.0333 -682.27 -192.74  -1076.25  -25.01  -1207.13  54.15 2.65  -60.55 
0.0367 -689.28 -198.25  -1088.50  -30.13  -1217.93  47.95 0.88  -61.61 





  14Table 3 
Certainty Equivalents at Various ARAC Levels (Scenario 2a – New Policy – Corn Base) 
ARAC Onion Cabbage  Cantaloupe Watermelon Honeydew Cotton  Corn  G.  Sorghum 
-0.0400  4829.19 126.38  1589.95  488.17  577.89  496.27 121.75 8.67 
-0.0367  4818.79 121.03  1580.50  480.67  567.43  485.99 114.61 3.41 
-0.0333  4806.37 115.04  1569.26  472.06  554.87  473.80 106.68 -1.96 
-0.0300  4791.28 108.25  1555.67  462.12  539.54  459.16 97.96  -7.35 
-0.0267  4772.60 100.51  1538.89  450.55  520.39  441.40 88.62  -12.64 
-0.0233  4748.94 91.55  1517.64  436.97  495.83  419.71 78.93  -17.73 
-0.0200  4718.10 81.06  1489.87  420.74  463.26  393.28 69.29  -22.53 
-0.0167  4676.38 68.64  1452.05  400.85  418.21  361.72 60.18  -26.99 
-0.0133  4616.84 53.81  1397.52  375.50  352.64  325.91 51.94  -31.07 
-0.0100  4524.19 36.16  1311.76  341.64  251.99  288.53 44.76  -34.77 
-0.0067  4353.87 15.57  1155.60  295.26  95.52  253.02 38.64  -38.10 
-0.0033  3888.99 -7.39  795.42  235.68  -116.79 221.36  33.44  -41.10 
0.0000  420.57 -36.57  146.29  73.14  -182.86 73.14  18.29  -36.57 
0.0033 -410.51  -54.35  -349.48  125.24  -662.79  169.60 25.12  -46.24 
0.0067 -502.50  -75.22  -604.16  92.54  -873.49  148.50 21.70  -48.44 
0.0100 -544.87  -93.37  -756.40  70.68  -980.72  130.11 18.63  -50.44 
0.0133 -571.42  -108.93 -847.49  55.07  -1042.67  114.14 15.83  -52.26 
0.0167 -590.64  -122.25 -906.17  43.05  -1084.03  100.34 13.25  -53.93 
0.0200 -605.68  -133.73 -946.76  33.20  -1114.32  88.40 10.85 -55.47 
0.0233 -617.99  -143.69 -976.45  24.76  -1137.79  78.05 8.60  -56.88 
0.0267 -628.35  -152.42 -999.12  17.29  -1156.65  69.04 6.50  -58.19 
0.0300 -637.24  -160.12 -1017.00  10.56  -1172.16  61.13 4.52  -59.41 
0.0333 -644.96  -166.96 -1031.48  4.40  -1185.14  54.15 2.65  -60.55 
0.0367 -651.72  -173.08 -1043.45  -1.26  -1196.14  47.95 0.88  -61.61 
0.0400 -657.70  -178.58 -1053.51  -6.48  -1205.58  42.39 -0.78 -62.61 
 
Table 4 
Certainty Equivalents at Various ARAC Levels (Scenario 2b – New Policy – Cotton Base) 
ARAC Onion  Cabbage  Cantaloupe  Watermelon Honeydew Cotton  Corn  G.  Sorghum 
-0.0400  4918.20 208.69  1679.50  576.14  674.02  496.27 121.75 8.67 
-0.0367  4907.78 203.85  1669.69  568.45  663.55  485.99 114.61 3.41 
-0.0333  4895.30 198.34  1658.04  559.69  651.00  473.80 106.68 -1.96 
-0.0300  4880.12 192.03  1643.98  549.66  635.65  459.16 97.96  -7.35 
-0.0267  4861.28 184.73  1626.65  538.10  616.49  441.40 88.62  -12.64 
-0.0233  4837.34 176.18  1604.78  524.63  591.89  419.71 78.93  -17.73 
-0.0200  4806.03 166.06  1576.30  508.64  559.20  393.28 69.29  -22.53 
-0.0167  4763.56 153.97  1537.68  489.05  513.87  361.72 60.18  -26.99 
-0.0133  4702.87 139.46  1482.26  463.98  447.56  325.91 51.94  -31.07 
-0.0100  4608.68 122.14  1395.55  430.23  345.02  288.53 44.76  -34.77 
-0.0067  4436.73 101.92  1238.44  383.60  184.72  253.02 38.64  -38.10 
-0.0033  3971.13 79.40  877.90  323.42  -30.37  221.36 33.44  -41.10 
0.0000  566.86 0.00  219.43  91.43  -73.14 73.14  18.29  -36.57 
0.0033 -323.13  33.34  -259.38  212.37  -572.87 169.60  25.12  -46.24 
0.0067 -415.17  12.86  -515.59  179.63  -780.67 148.50  21.70  -48.44 
0.0100 -457.59  -4.92  -670.68  157.63  -885.82 130.11  18.63  -50.44 
0.0133 -484.30  -20.07  -763.91  141.76  -946.09 114.14  15.83  -52.26 
0.0167 -503.78  -32.92  -824.11  129.39  -986.07 100.34  13.25  -53.93 
0.0200 -519.12  -43.87  -865.82  119.15  -1015.26 88.40  10.85  -55.47 
0.0233 -531.73  -53.24  -896.35  110.30  -1037.90 78.05  8.60 -56.88 
0.0267 -542.36  -61.33  -919.66  102.43  -1056.13 69.04  6.50 -58.19 
0.0300 -551.48  -68.37  -938.03  95.30  -1071.18 61.13  4.52 -59.41 
0.0333 -559.39  -74.54  -952.87  88.79  -1083.83 54.15  2.65 -60.55 
0.0367 -566.31  -80.00  -965.12  82.79  -1094.60 47.95  0.88 -61.61 
0.0400 -572.41  -84.85  -975.38  77.27  -1103.86 42.39  -0.78  -62.61 
 
  15Table 5 
Certainty Equivalents at Various ARAC Levels (Scenario 2c – New Policy – Sorghum Base) 
ARAC Onion Cabbage  Cantaloupe Watermelon Honeydew Cotton  Corn  G.  Sorghum 
-0.0400  4828.56 117.95  1592.59  486.90  577.31  496.27 121.75 8.67 
-0.0367  4818.14 113.05  1582.78  479.14  566.84  485.99 114.61 3.41 
-0.0333  4805.68 107.50  1571.13  470.25  554.29  473.80 106.68 -1.96 
-0.0300  4790.51 101.17  1557.07  460.03  538.95  459.16 97.96  -7.35 
-0.0267  4771.69 93.85  1539.74  448.21  519.79  441.40 88.62  -12.64 
-0.0233  4747.80 85.31  1517.86  434.39  495.20  419.71 78.93  -17.73 
-0.0200  4716.59 75.21  1489.37  417.99  462.56  393.28 69.29  -22.53 
-0.0167  4674.27 63.14  1450.73  397.97  417.35  361.72 60.18  -26.99 
-0.0133  4613.85 48.64  1395.27  372.51  351.38  325.91 51.94  -31.07 
-0.0100  4520.03 31.29  1308.51  338.51  249.78  288.53 44.76  -34.77 
-0.0067  4348.47 11.00  1151.39  291.87  91.70  253.02 38.64  -38.10 
-0.0033  3882.87 -11.63  790.48  231.95  -121.22 221.36  33.44  -41.10 
0.0000  420.57 -36.57  146.29  73.14  -219.43 73.14  18.29  -36.57 
0.0033 -414.28  -57.86  -352.35  121.53  -666.34  169.60 25.12  -46.24 
0.0067 -506.33  -78.34  -608.32  89.19  -876.41  148.50 21.70  -48.44 
0.0100 -548.71  -96.10  -762.09  67.73  -983.11  130.11 18.63  -50.44 
0.0133 -575.32  -111.24 -854.18  52.54  -1044.62  114.14 15.83  -52.26 
0.0167 -594.65  -124.14 -913.53  40.99  -1085.62  100.34 13.25  -53.93 
0.0200 -609.84  -135.18 -954.59  31.65  -1115.64  88.40 10.85 -55.47 
0.0233 -622.29  -144.72 -984.64  23.76  -1138.91  78.05 8.60  -56.88 
0.0267 -632.79  -153.04 -1007.59  16.88  -1157.61  69.04 6.50  -58.19 
0.0300 -641.79  -160.34 -1025.68  10.73  -1173.02  61.13 4.52  -59.41 
0.0333 -649.60  -166.82 -1040.33  5.17  -1185.92  54.15 2.65  -60.55 
0.0367 -656.43  -172.60 -1052.43  0.07  -1196.88  47.95 0.88  -61.61 
0.0400 -662.45  -177.80 -1062.58  -4.63  -1206.27  42.39 -0.78 -62.61 
 
Table 6 
Ranking Based on CE (Highest to Lowest) 
  Scenario 1    Scenario 2a    Scenario 2b    Scenario 2c 
ARAC -.04  ON   ON    ON    ON 
  CP    CP    CP    CP 
  HD   HD    HD    HD 
  CT    CT    WM    CT 
  WM    WM    CT    WM 
  CN    CB    CB    CN 
  CB    CN    CN    CB 
  GS    GS    GS    GS 
 
ARAC 0  ON   ON    ON    ON 
  CP    CP    CP    CP 
 WM1   WM3   WM    WM5
 CT1   CT3    CT    CT5
  CN    CN    CN    CN 
 GS2   GS4    CB    GS6
 CB2   CB4    GS    CB6
  HD   HD    HD    HD 
 
ARAC .04  CT    CT    WM    CT 
  CN    CN    CT    CN 
  WM    WM    CN    WM 
  GS    GS    GS    GS 
  CB    CB    CB    CB 
  ON   ON    ON    ON 
  CP    CP    CP    CP 
  HD   HD    HD    HD 
 
Matching subscripts denote equal CEs and therefore equal ranking (i.e. WM and CT are both ranked 3
rd in scenario 1, ARAC 0). 
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